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$Unique_ID{USH00748}
$Pretitle{75}
$Title{Pearl Harbor: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal
Chapter XIV Conditions Which Prevailed Or Were Encountered In Salvage}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Wallin, VAdm. Homer N.}
$Affiliation{USN}
$Subject{ships
salvage
navy
yard
work
japanese
divers
water
fleet
war}
$Volume{}
$Date{1968}
$Log{Divers Emerging*0074801.scf
OKLAHOMA Ventilation*0074802.scf
Divers*0074803.scf
}
Book: Pearl Harbor: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal
Author: Wallin, VAdm. Homer N.
Affiliation: USN
Date: 1968
Chapter XIV Conditions Which Prevailed Or Were Encountered In Salvage
1. Lack of Material
Pearl Harbor was noted for shortages. This was a fact of life in a
comparatively new fleet base 2000 miles from home. It has already been
pointed out that there was a great shortage of oil, of oil tankers, of service
craft, and countless other things to support a fleet which was ever growing.
The treacherous Japanese attack on a Sunday morning accentuated these
shortages. If adequate pumping facilities had been at hand some of the ships
would not have been sunk. If better fire protection had been available many
of the fires which caused so much damage could have been extinguished.
The salvage effort would have been made much easier with ample supplies
near at hand. The shortage of lumber and fastenings was acute; the shortage
of manpower, especially electric welders and carpenters was keenly felt. All
civilian mechanics and engineers were in short supply at the Navy Yard and in
Honolulu.
The right kind of pumps arrived late. These were the deep-well pumps
which were used effectively on the later battleships, especially West Virginia
and Oklahoma. They varied in size up to 10 inches, and for Oklahoma as big as
18 inches and even 20 inches. They were driven by electric or diesel power,
and were essential in ridding a badly wounded ship of incoming water.
2. Fire Hazards on the Ships Themselves
The European War taught the fleet much regarding fire hazards and
floatability. Before the surprise air attack many fire hazards had been
removed from combat ships. There is a tendency on the part of all personnel
to be "pack rats," to have at hand anything that may sometime be required.
This inclination of human nature resulted in stowing away an excess of rubber
sheeting, paints, canvas, oakum, linoleum, and so on. These were removed and
greatly reduced the fire hazard and improved the floatability.
During the war all linoleum was taken off the ships and all oil paints
were put ashore. Paint was chipped off down to bare metal and later was
replaced with latex or water paints. These have satisfactory preservative
qualities and are better than oil paints in resisting fire and high
temperature.
3. Salvage of Ordnance Material
Of all shortages, limited ordnance material presented the worst problem.
Except for anti-aircraft guns on ships there was little defense of Pearl
Harbor and the various airfields. No temporary batteries were installed, and
30 caliber machine guns were the main ones ready at the air bases. The
batteries of ships were restricted in their zones of action, and Sunday
morning at "colors" was a time of maximum unreadiness.
Thus it was that one of the prime jobs was to build up the anti-aircraft
defense. This was done quickly by transferring the batteries and their
ammunition from disabled ships to points of vantage around the Navy Yard and
air stations. Much of the removal work from ships was done by divers, and
though this slowed up the transfer it was not long before Pearl Harbor had a
tolerable anti-aircraft defense.
The Ordnance Section gave attention to other salvage as well as
anti-aircraft batteries and ammunition. They worked assiduously in saving
range finders, directors, small arms, and fine ordnance instruments from
various sunken ships. This material required care and preservation in most
cases, and the material was soon ready for use against the enemy.
4. Electrical Equipment
When it was ascertained from the experience on Nevada that total
submergence in sea water permitted electrical equipment to be used again,
there was much surprise in the fleet. Of course, proper steps for care and
preservation had to be taken. Even the most delicate instruments, such as
ammeters and wattmeters, were usable if properly cleaned and preserved before
exposure to the air. The same pertained to cables and motors. If properly
dried out and cleaned thoroughly they were usable. However, vital electric
cables and motors were replaced.
It was learned that low humidity helped re-use. The humidity near the
ocean meant that the equipment would ultimately fail. To avoid this, some of
it was sent as far away as Denver. There it stood every test but proved
questionable when returned to the seacoast. It should be clearly understood
that here we are dealing with electric gear that has been submerged in sea
water only a comparatively short time and has not been subjected to the tidal
currents of the sea.
It was realized that no chance should be taken with respect to high
potential lines and equipment. Accordingly, all such electrical gear was
replaced as work progressed. No difficulty was experienced with either high
potential or ordinary electrical equipment later in the war.
5. Japanese Torpedoes and Bombs
Salvage experience proved that a fair proportion of Japanese bombs and
torpedoes failed to explode. This was especially true of the 800 kilogram
bombs dropped from about 10,000 feet. These were made over from
armor-piercing shells of 14 or 15-inch size, and were intended to pierce the
armored decks of battleships, aircraft carriers, or cruisers. They had an
explosive charge of about 430 pounds. On the other hand, the 250 kilogram
bombs used by dive-bombers were very effective and were frequently mistaken
for incendiary bombs by our forces. The explosive charge of these bombs was
about 135 pounds.
The torpedoes used by the Japanese seem to cover a variety of explosive
charges. According to the Japanese story given after the surrender, they all
were of the "Long Tom" variety which were so effective in the Guadalcanal
Campaign. These use oxygen in lieu of air which is safer, and carry an
explosive charge of about 1000 to 1200 pounds. The American counterpart has
an explosive charge of only 500 to 600 pounds.
It is worth noting that American torpedoes fired by our submarines early
in the war sometimes failed to explode although they could be heard making
contact with enemy ships. This deficiency was rectified after we developed a
more reliable exploder.
Likewise, our close range anti-aircraft batteries had limitations. The
American 1.1 inch in quadruple mounts seemed to be effective but frequent
jamming curtailed efficiency. Our Bureau of Ordnance was in the process of
getting from Sweden the 40-millimeter Bofors gun which could be mounted in
twos or fours, and the 20- millimeter Oerlikon gun from Switzerland. These
were used in great numbers on our ships from 1942 on.
There was much strafing by Japanese airplanes. Aside from causing a few
casualties, this was ineffective. It has a value when it deters personnel
from doing what should be done, but the evidence is clear that such things
were done despite the strafing. So far as the ships were concerned, it is
evident that strafing causes no real damage. At times, however, strafing is
highly effective against personnel.
6. Diving Experience
Without competent divers the salvage work would have been impossible.
Credit has been given to the various divers in each operation, but their
outstanding efficiency deserves mention again. The supervision of the divers
was excellent. Lieutenant Haynes was a stickler for safety, as were his
assistants. The divers from the Salvage Division, the Navy Yard, Ortolan,
Widgeon, and elsewhere made about 4,000 dives totaling some 16,000 hours
underwater without a single serious casualty. The contractor had one
casualty. The total of the contractor and the Navy was about 5,000 dives with
about 20,000 hours underwater. Considering the difficulty, hazard, and
importance of the work, this is a remarkable record.
7. Deadly Gas Encountered on Most Ships
The prevalence of hydrogen sulphide in Nevada and other ships was indeed
a new phenomenon. While we usually think this gas has the smell of rotten
eggs, the gas when absorbed in water at high pressure has no smell at all. At
higher concentrations it is undetectable because it tends to paralyze the
sense of smell. There were other gases encountered but none so deadly and
widespread. Lack of oxygen in the spaces unwatered was commonplace.
Hydrogen sulphide is formed by polluted water working on paper products.
It was found in compartments of every large ship, sometimes in lethal doses.
After the Nevada incident, in which two men were lost, great care was taken
with regard to sending men into spaces recently unwatered. Tests were taken
of the air and frequent inspections made by experts of this industrial hazard.
Each man wore some litmus paper on his tank suit to reveal the presence of
gas.
[See Divers Emerging: Divers emerging from gas-filled compartments.]
Ample ventilation put fresh air into each compartment to insure the
dilution of deadly gases and to provide oxygen into spaces which were
deficient. When necessary to send men into untested areas they were equipped
with gas masks or rescue breathing apparatus. Divers were prevented from
using only face masks in waters which showed heavy pollution.
[See OKLAHOMA Ventilation: Ventilation for work in Oklahoma blister.]
8. Gasoline Explosions
The gasoline vapor explosion on California taught an important lesson.
Despite ventilation which was deemed adequate, the accident occurred. It was
a serious explosion too, and would have caused casualties to anyone in the
vicinity at the time. As it was, the structure was ruptured and an efficient
hull patch rendered useless near the time for drydocking. Luckily it happened
in a location which permitted isolation of the flooded spaces. This allowed
drydocking on schedule.
Advantage was taken of this lesson in future salvage work. On West
Virginia and other ships, the gasoline tanks were thoroughly emptied and
gasoline vapors eliminated.
When a steam blanket cannot be used over oil, it is mandatory that divers
engaged in welding or cutting drill holes somewhat higher than where they are
working to allow oil vapors to escape. This method was used on Oklahoma, and
though some small explosions occurred none were serious.
9. Electric-Drive Battleships
When two electric-drive battleships were among the casualties of the air
raid, it was at first assumed that four or five years would be required to
rehabilitate the propulsion machinery of California and West Virginia. But
necessity is the mother of invention and the mainspring of action.
Details are given in the account of California salvage of the rewinding
of alternators and motors and the restocking of their iron elements. Suffice
it to say here that California was on her way to Bremerton on 10 October 1942
and West Virginia followed shortly after. Both travelled under their own
power and emerged from the Bremerton Navy Yard as modern ships to participate
fully in the war against Japan.
10. Classified Correspondence and Personal Property
Great care was always used to insure the proper handling of classified
correspondence and papers. This included personal property which was
retrieved from lockers of men who were lost or who had departed on other
ships. Ordinarily these papers or valuables were delivered to the Commanding
Officer or to whomever he might designate as the proper officer to receive
them. Personal property removed from lockers was tagged for identification
and delivered in due course to owners or relatives.
11. Removal of Human Bodies
Some of the ships had large numbers of human bodies in various
compartments. A scheme was developed for handling these without the knowledge
of the men who comprised the working parties. Two or three feet of water were
left in each compartment so that the bodies could be floated into canvas bags.
The bags were tightly tied and transported to the Naval Hospital for proper
identification and burial. The method was very effective and was undisturbing
to the salvage crew.
12. Cleaning of Compartments
The cleaning of compartments of unwatered ships was a beggarly job.
There was always a shortage of manpower, as the original crews had largely
gone to other duty. Trained men for the fleet were in short supply; even
recruits were in great demand, as were naval reservists who had some training
in their specialties. The men for salvage work came mostly from the Receiving
Ship or from vessels in ordinary. These men had numerous assignments and it
was only near drydocking time that the total reached as many as 400 to 500
men. The Salvage Officer requested 800 men near the end of a job, but this
figure was never reached.
Each man of the cleaning crew had a tank suit and knee-high rubber boots
for especially dirty work. The suits which became oil soaked were turned in
for a freshly laundered suit. Boots were cleaned by the wearer. Only
selected men were given gas masks for entering spaces that had not yet been
adequately ventilated and lighted. They had litmus paper attached to their
suits to show presence of toxic gases.
The cleaning crew found material and equipment of all sorts strewn about,
and oil everywhere. Their first job was the removal of wreckage. The next
was washing down by a high pressure hose. Both sea water and fresh water were
tried, but fresh water did a better job. This was followed by a caustic
solution which cut the oil coating. Then fresh water would do a clean and
finished job.
One of the chores of the cleaning gang was to remove ammunition from
turrets and magazines, and to take off cases of canned goods and other stores.
All of the latter was scrapped in accordance with the recommendation of the
representative from the Department of Agriculture. In a region of food
shortage it was hard to see unbulged canned food dumped at sea, but that was
the order of competent authority.
13. Work Performed by the Navy Yard
Too much credit cannot be given to the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, for its
part in ship salvage and rehabilitation. There was a close tie between the
Salvage Division and the Navy Yard. Consequently the Salvage Division was
given up-to-date information from Design and Planning with respect to
stability and floatability of any ship under varying conditions. True enough
there was difference of opinion at times, but these differences were always
worked out between the parties involved.
The performance of the Navy Yard when the raised ships entered drydock
left nothing to be desired. In spite of the heavy workload of supporting a
fleet at war, the Navy Yard was always available to repair, on a permanent or
temporary basis, the ships presented to it. This was done despite a growing
shortage of manpower in several of the engineering and mechanical ratings. In
due time this shortage was overcome by importing workers from the mainland
Navy Yards and shipbuilding companies. It might be mentioned that all of
these men were not desirable, and a keen eye was necessary to detect
professional gamblers and other similar characters.
Special mention should be made of the Navy Yard's work in rehabilitating
electric motors and electric-drive battleships. Through the Yard various
contracts were made for handling motors and other electrical gear. These
contracts ranged from Honolulu to Oakland. Full cooperation with the General
Electric men and the Navy Yard brought the electric-drive battleships to the
point where they could go to Bremerton under their own power and later join
the fleet which defeated Japan.
The services rendered by the Navy Yard are too numerous to mention.
Among others, it furnished scarce scrap materials to manufacturers on the
mainland. It gained the thanks of government officials in Washington who
oversaw such work. The Navy Yard prided itself in sending large amounts of
steel, rubber, electric cables, brass, and aluminum to the mainland.
The Japanese could not stop the flow of scrap materials to the mainland
throughout the war. Neither were the Japanese effective in intercepting ships
carrying personnel or other material to or from Pearl Harbor; nor were they
effective against the crippled ships which regularly crossed the ocean on the
way to Bremerton or to Mare Island or other California ports. Japanese
submarines proved to be a complete loss.
14. Use of Sunken or Damaged Ships in the War Effort
The enemy achieved much of his goal in the perfidious air raid of 7
December 1941. Although only 19 ships of the almost 100 that occupied berths
at Pearl Harbor were sunk or damaged, an important part of the fleet was
immobilized for many months.
The shortage of ships prevented decisive action against a superior foe.
It was only after new ships joined the fleet from building yards or the
Atlantic that offensive warfare could be pursued in earnest.
In a war which lasted nearly four years all nineteen of the Pearl Harbor
victims, except Oklahoma, Arizona, and Utah, saw action against the Japanese
Navy. This included vessels which had been given up by the Secretary of the
Navy as lost, or enumerated by the Japanese as destroyed at Pearl Harbor. The
marvel of salvage surprised not only the Japanese but also our own forces.
As described, many of the salvaged ships performed wonders during the
war. Their strength augmented the fleet, and it was this overall strength
that ultimately won the unconditional surrender of Japan. We learned that
sunken or damaged ships can be put to work again and with greatly increased
potential.
It should be mentioned that the battleships at Pearl Harbor were ill
prepared for survival. They were not in a battle condition. As a comparison,
consider the German battleship Bismarck, or the two new Japanese 64,000 ton
battleships which were put into service in 1941 and 1942. The metacentric
height of each ship was about ten feet or more. These ships were in action
with all closures made, and with excellent damage repair facilities. They
were finally sunk, but not until each of them had taken approximately 10
torpedoes and from 10 to 20 bombs.
15. Spirit of the Salvage Crew
Enough cannot be said in praise of the salvage crew. They worked hard
and earnestly. They soon saw that the results of their efforts exceeded the
fondest hopes of their supporters and they were urged on by their successive
achievements.
[See Divers: Divers standing in front of decompression chamber.]
Much has been said of the men who contributed most to the salvage of each
ship. Praise has been given to the Navy Yard and to the Pacific Bridge
Company, but little has been said of the men in the Central Office. They
consistently did much to keep the gears meshed and turning. Without them the
Salvage Organization would not have functioned smoothly.
All projects were pursued to a happy conclusion. There was no bickering
or an "I told you so" attitude. There was a meeting of the minds in all the
jobs in which the Salvage Division was engaged. There was never a lack of
confidence. Instead, there was a feeling of assurance in the outcome of each
job. This consistent oneness of purpose can best be explained by the
operation of the One Mind which governs all things well.
I made recommendations to the Commandant of the Navy Yard regarding the
medals which a grateful Nation should bestow upon its benefactors engaged in
salvage work. Before departing for the South Pacific I was recommended for
the Navy's Distinguished Service Medal by the Forces Afloat, and this was
presented to me by Admiral Nimitz on the deck of the aircraft carrier
Enterprise. At that time about a dozen other medals were presented for deeds
of valor. Admiral Nimitz read the citation for the work performed by the
Salvage Organization and ended by adding, "for being an undying optimist".
The Medal was accepted by me in the name of the organization which I had the
honor to head.